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THE CORRELATION OF WORK FOR
HIGHER DEGREES IN GRADUATE
SCHOOLS AND LAW SCHOOLS1
By ERNST FREUND 2
The relation of the study of law to other university studies
has in the past been considered mainly from one aspect which has
presented little difficulty. It is generally recognized that a lawyer
is better prepared for his life work and is likely to obtain a broader
view of legal principles if he brings to his profession some education in political economy, sociology, and political science. College
courses in these fields are therefore. recommended for pre-legal
training, and are freely taken by students expecting to enter the
law school. Work of this kind is chiefly undergraduate, and does
not affect the relation of the law school to the graduate school.
In entering upon a discussion of the correlation of work for
higher degrees in the law and graduate schools, it is first of all
important to understand the conditions with reference to advanced
work and the corresponding degrees found in American law schools
at the present moment.
Recent advances in law school standards, either requiring a college degree as a prerequisite for a law degree or recognizing a
previous college degree by the bestowal of a higher than the ordinary
law degree have not changed the strictly vocational character of
law school studies.
In 1902 when the law school of the University of Chicago was
established, the thought that law work done by college graduates
was deserving of the same recognition as other graduate work
led to the introduction of the J. D. degree, which has since-been
1.
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adopted on the same basis by California, Leland Stanford, Jr.,
Michigan, and New York University. To some extent the appropriateness of the doctor's degree was also supported by the argument that the study of law on the basis of cases is a form of research; but in opposition to this contention it is insisted that it is
not the mere use of original sources, but the independent discovery,
collation, and sifting of source material which in the graduate
school constitutes the title to the doctorate, and that the only corresponding work in law schools-brief writing for moot courts or
practice courses, or note writing for law reviews-is of too limited
a scope to be reckoned as the equivalent of a thesis. The bestowal
of the doctor's degree in law upon the basis of purely vocational
training (although to some extent supported by European precedents) has therefore met with a certain amount of criticism, and
some of the foremost university law schools have refused to adopt
it. In any event it must be recognized that the J. D. degree of
this type and the Ph. D. degree represent work of such different
character that it would serve little purpose to discuss the question
of correlation. We may justly claim for the best law schools with
purely vocational instruction a high and useful function well-performed, but that function is not the stimulation or direction of independent research with the view to the advancement of knowledge.
It would be otherwise if the- law school curriculum made provision and gave opportunity for serious investigative work on the
part of students.
The preparation of a thesis figures as a matter of fact in the
announcements of a few law schools as a part requirement for the
regular degree, notably in California and Wisconsin, at one time
also in Michigan. Nowhere, however, is this thesis required to be
printed, nor does its position in relation to the entire course seem
to rise very much above the level of a superior grade of term paper.
It certainly does not correspond to the place of the doctor's thesis in
graduate work. There is a prevailing conviction that the entire
period of the three years' residence is needed to do even bare justice
to the field of taught law that the law school offers. In other words,
there is no -present inclination to abate strictly professional in favor
of research work, even if this policy should entail the relinquishment of the claim to the doctor's degree in law.
It is possible to save the integrity of the professional curriculum by offering opportunity for research work after the completion
of the regular course. In a very informal way this has been done
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in Pennsylvania since 1907. The law school announces, without
any further specification, a graduate course for the writing of a
thesis under the direction of the faculty, a single fee of $100 being
charged for a course of one or more scholastic years. Northwestern began to offer a fourth year in 1908, requiring a thesis upon
some phase of local law worthy of publication in the ILLINOIs LAW
REVIEW; Harvard introduced the fourth year in 1910, Michigan in
1915. Fourth-year work is also provided for in Columbia, Yale,
and Boston, and New York University announces that it is prepared to offer it.
Pennsylvania, Northwestern, and Columbia recognize this work
by a master's degree in law; Harvard by a doctor's degree; Michigan
holds out the two degrees in the alternative. Neither Harvard nor
Michigan requires a dissertation, and while the other schools demand
a thesis or essay, only Pennsylvania and Northwestern seem to
make provision for its being printed. It has been admitted in
Columbia that the arrangement for the master's degree does not
work satisfactorily, and the introduction of the doctor's degree has
been strongly recommended by a committee of the faculty, though
so far without success.
In order to judge of the possibilities of correlation, it is necessary to scrutinize somewhat closely the tendencies of the new
graduate work in law. If its hope lay in the intensification of the
work done in the professional school, i. e. in carrying to a more
advanced stage the case work of the traditional type, we should
expect a prominent place in the graduate course to be given to
research in common law problems, with strong emphasis upon the
production of a dissertation. But this is the case only in Pennsylvania and Northwestern, while, on the other hand, Harvard and
Michigan have no thesis requirement at all, and nowhere do we find
the mention of specific common law topics or subjects for graduate
courses, although the common law offers abundant material for
dogmatic research.
The subjects which dominate the fourth-year course are outside of the ordinary field of professional studies and relate to public
and international law, legal history and foreign law, jurisprudence,
and legislative problems. Among the courses announced we find
the following: theory of law and legislation, province of written
and unwritten law, problems of law reform; Roman law, civil law
and modern codes; introduction to comparative law; procedural
reform; penal legislation and administration; theory and practice
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of legislation; problems of contemporary legislation; analytical
jurisprudence; philosophy of law; and Anglo-American legal
history. We need only place in juxtaposition a list of the usual
law school courses: contracts; torts; trusts; wills; pleading; evidence; corporations; partnerships; suretyship; mortgages, insurance, etc., to realize that the usual order is reversed in law; it is
the non-graduate work which is specialized and intensive, while
many graduate courses are of the most general description, being
apparently intended to introduce the student to phases of juristic
thought and source material with which his professional studies
have left him entirely unacquainted.
This character of graduate courses becomes especially striking
when we compare it with the pronounced policy of law school instruction in favor of rigorous and intensive mental discipline, which
has barred from most schools even an elementary introductory
course, because it is believed that such a course would not be
capable of severe and exacting treatment. While a relaxation of
this policy in the case of advanced students only need not inspire
serious apprehension, yet the majority of the new graduate courses
seem to have been and to be still looked upon with some doubt
and misgiving, and it was perhaps a consequence of this skeptical
attitude that when the fourth-year course was introduced in Harvard, the dean's report failed to make any mention of the fact.
Analyzing the new graduate law work somewhat further, we
may distinguish in it three main objects: first, the extension of
the traditional type of work by including phases of public law not
previously treated by a number of schools, particularly administrative and international law; second, a sort of higher criticism of
the common law on the basis of historical and comparative jurisprudence, which may be supposed to be the ultimate aim of the
courses in legal history and Roman law, and the direct aim of
the courses in jurisprudence; and third, an entirely new attempt to
take up constructive problems of legislation and law reform.
It is a noteworthy fact directly bearing upon the problem now
under discussion that nearly the entire fourth-year law program
had been anticipated in several universities by schools or departments of political science, and their experience with this work
should not be neglected.
The fact that courses in jurisprudence and Roman law were
given in the name of political science undoubtedly tended to discredit them with law students; to other than advanced law students
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they were given at a considerable disadvantage, and intensive research work could be thought of in only very exceptional cases. The
opinion has been expressed that a more intimate connection with the
law school, and the bestowal of a law degree, will be necessary to
produce satisfactory results with this kind of work. A greater
measure of success in the fourth year of the law school may well
be looked forward to; but for original work in legal history, the
training, equipment, and special gifts of the historian are needed
more than those of the lawyer or jurist; and the decline of the
study of the Roman law in German universities since the introduction of the civil code does not seem to promise well for the future
of that study, which seems destined to fall into the hands of classical scholars. As far as continental law is concerned, it would be
strange if, with modem facilities for travel under normal conditions, a student desiring to take up the thorough study of some
branch of French or German law should not prefer to pursue his
studies abroad.
In view of these conditions it is doubtful whether the character of the instruction in this phase of fourth-year law work will
be fundamentally different from what it has been in the past in
departments of political science, although it may be expected to
become more profitable if taken with a background of three years
of common law.
In undertaking to teach public law, departments of political
science were favored by the fact that there was a certain demand
for such instruction in the law schools. As early as 1891 Columbia
recognized public law courses for credit toward the law degree.
Constitutional law was commonly treated as a regular law school
course, but other public law subjects were first taught by men primarily connected with political science. International law still
stands to a considerable extent outside of the law school, and Harvard Law School even now admits it only with the addition to the
title "as administered by the courts," thus saving the law course
from profanation. The subject of administrative law.was developed
in a school of political science, and that of municipal corporations
was at least first taught there.
However, the more favorable the attitude of the law school
wa's to these subjects, the more they tended to become pure law
school subjects. This was due both to the fact that the law school
furnished the larger and more responsive constituency, and to the
necessity of founding all further work in public law upon a
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thorough knowledge of its common law status; but incidentally the
evolution of these courses testifies to the absorbing and overmastering interest of the judicial aspect of any branch of law that is administered by the courts. Either the political science side of the
subject suffered by the emphasizing of the legal side, as in the case
of administrative law, or the two sides became practically divorced
as in the case of municipal government and municipal corporations.
It was undoubtedly the subordinate place of the judicial side of
international law which made it possible to maintain a fair balance
between the law and political science of that subject.
While thus public law by being admitted into the regular law
curriculum tends to be assimilated in character and method of
treatment to other common law subjects, and problems of organization and constitutional relations fall to departmiehts of government
and political science, this division leaves no room for the constructive aspect of public law on its legal side. 'In this respect public
law shares the fate of private law, the constructive problems of
which likewise lack systematic treatment, while principles of criminal legislation become more and more the subject of scientific investigation.
When we speak of law reform, we have in mind all the inquiry
and agitation that is directed to the more perfect realization of
justice in its relation to legal rights and remedies. Problems of
law reform can be effectually approached only upon a basis of
thorough familiarity with the common law, and constitute a field
of endeavor in which lawyers hold undisputed sway; it seems therefore to be believed that the ordinary professional training of the
lawyer is an adequate preparation for their solution, and if legislation on legal subjects has in the past been often defective and disappointing this is apt to be ascribed to lack of competent professional advice.
The fact, however, is that principles of common law or equity
furnish by no means adequate guidance to needed readjustments of
legal relations, and that legislation has often had to do pioneer work
without the aid of any preliminary scientific work.
Legislative thought has thus become a constructive factor in
American jurisprudence which, however inferior to judicial thought
ii juristic scholarship and technique, cannot be safely ignored by
legal science. Yet American law schools practically treat legislation (except as a subject of judicial interpretation) as a negligible
quantity. And still less do they consider it their business to treat
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systematically of the principles by which future legislation should
be guided. This is a direct consequence of the exclusive devotion
of law school instruction to the training of practitioners in court;
legislative problems are not possible subjects of discussion in the
court-room, and therefore not appropriate subjects of class-room
discussion in the law school. The exclusively vocational character
of the law school has thus been responsible for the serious neglect
of an important aspect of legal science.
Under these circumstances the appearance in the graduate law
curriculum of courses in legislation and law reform promises to
be of special significance. This may not be fully realized even by
those who offer them, for there has been so far little intimation
of the precise scope and purpose of these courses. In some cases
there is a special reference to procedural reform and criminal
legislation, these being the subjects in which the greatest amount
of systematic thought has been given to law reform and principles
of legislation. It is reasonably certain that in course of time such
problems as liability, the protection of purchasers and creditors,
settled and community interests in property, form and informality
in legal acts, or-in public law-discretion, compensation, penalties,
methods of control, and methods of enforcement, will be scientifically studied with a view to discovering definite and demonstrable
working principles of legislation, to be substituted for the prevailing
fashion of reaching legislative decisions on controverted questions
of legal policy on the basis of conjectural impressions and forecasts.
Such a result may not be in all cases attainable, but in the mere
adoption of new methods of inquiry and new standards of judgment there will be a gain.
Judicial decisions, instead of absolutely dominating legal
thought, will be subjected to a more detached criticism, and may
have to take their place as mere expressions of prevailing legal ideas
and as factors in the production of social reactions which must furnish the ultimate standards of law. Legislative thought will count
as no less legitimate a subject of study than judicial thought, and
both the history of legislation and the history of its judicial interpretation, administration, and enforcement will serve to shift the
emphasis in the consideration of legal rules from correctness and
authoritative sanction of theory to the justice and effectiveness of
their operation. It will be realized that courts must necessarily
look upon canons of justice as static and imposed by authority, and
that the monopoly of the judicial point of view in law schools and
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law treatises unduly narrows the province of legal science. And by
adding to the study and criticism of abstract concepts embodied in
rules and principles, the observation and estimate of the living
forces and tendencies which subject these concepts to the test of
human experience and social reaction, legal science will assume a
much closer relation to the other social sciences than it bears at the
present time.
The limitation of the traditional aspect of law can indeed be
best understood from the point of view of the social sciences. To
them the law means the judicial administration and enforcement of
existing arrangements, and represents the conservative forces which
retard forward-looking legislative movements. It thus appears too
much in the light of an inconvenient obstacle. It does not seem to
be sufficiently realized that the preservation of the essentials of
law is a social object second to none. Just as economic science has
had to learn to look upon the social aspirations of labor not as
antagonistic tendencies to be overcome, but as legitimate factors to
be fitted into economic purposes, so all the social sciences must
learn to look upon legal rights as a competing social interest with
whose claims their own demands must be harmonized. The progress of the social sciences should naturally bring about this more
sympathetic attitude toward law, but the complex mechanism of
legal rights and remedies, the understanding and handling of which
requires long and specialized training, practically debars others than
lawyers from effective constructive work in this direction, and
unless legal science assumes the development of this aspect of the
law, it cannot be expected to be accomplished with any degree of
success.
In the framing of specific legislative measures considerations
of social, economic, and legal policy are practically so interwoven
that satisfactory solutions depend upon intimate co-operation from
the three points of view. It can hardly be otherwise than that this
connection should express itself in the organization and conduct
of university work. In the past, however, it has affected the social
science departments more than the law school. The great organic
legislation which in the last fifty years has revolutionized the entire
relation of law to business, is discussed in political economy and
not in law school 6ourses. The signs point to a similar transformation of the relation of the state to all forms of organized social
endeavor, and the university study of this legislation is likely to
fall to sociology which has already in a number of institutions ap-
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propriated the new science of criminology. It is true that it was
an American law school which organized the American Institute
of Criminal Law and Criminology, and law teachers have taken
an active part in its work. But this co-operation has always been
qualified by the reservation that law school instruction must not
be affected by the new methods and points of view, and the law
library has never been regarded as the appropriate repository for
literature on problems of legislative policy and reform.
It may be expected that the wider scope of jurisprudence recognized in the new graduate law studies will alter this condition. In
France and Germany, where jurisprudence has never lost entirely
the constructive or non-judicial point of view, university instruction
in law has always retained a closer contact with the social sciences
than exists between law and other graduate studies in this country;
the legal and political science faculty often forms one division of
the university. The development in America is not likely to be
controlled by European precedents, but if the more constructive
study of law can establish itself in American law schools successfully, its correlation to other graduate studies may well be left to
take care of itself.
The more difficult problem will be that of correlating the
graduate courses in law to the professional law work. Will the
former be able to assert themselves in competition with the latter?
The energy that goes into advanced work must in a measure be
diverted from professional instruction, and the inducements are
nearly all the other way. Instruction in the better American law
schools is in a satisfactory condition; it compares favorably not only
with other university teaching, graduate or undergraduate, but also
with the teaching of law in Europe. The now generally prevailing
case method is effective and interesting to teacher and student alike,
and is believed to be superior to any other method of teaching. The
intelligent study of the common law is intellectually fascinating
and exacting, and its immediate practical value is indisputable; no
one could reasonably think of displacing the bulk of the present
curriculum. The time of teachers is fully occupied with wellorganized and well-attended courses, so that there is little waste
in law school work. The newly introduced work necessarily involves a certain amount of experimentation, and its immediate
results may now and then be disappointing. Its method will be
not merely different from that of the teaching of the common law,
but it will also be less easily handled for class-room purposes. The
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material is inferior in quality and interest to case law, and much
less readily available. The results that can be looked for will lack
the precision and the authoritative sanction that make the study of
the common law so satisfactory to the mind that demands certainty.
Under these circumstances it must be expected that professional teaching will continue to absorb the main energies of law
teachers, and unless graduate work can be so organized that it will
grow naturally out of the professional work, its future must be
precarious. Even those who believe in the newly projected work
prefer the large prbfessional classes to the small number of graduate students for the greater stimulus and reaction that come from
large numbers. Their effort will naturally be to gain for the new
type of work a place in the professional curriculum, and this they
will not accomplish unless they present courses of the practical
value of which students will be convinced, and that can be taught
by methods that can be made at least reasonably effective. Until
they convince their colleagues of the success of their efforts, the
common law will retain exclusive possession of the professional
curriculum, and the graduate course will languish more or less as
an exotic.
The entire problem then which we are discussing is a problemfor the law school to take up and solve. The difficulties in the
way of the indicated development should not be underestimated, but
there are factors that seem decisive in favor of the new departure.
It is unlikely that the great law schools which have committed
themselves to the new work will abandon it without giving it a
reasonable chance to prove its value and its possibilities. The growing demand for expert assistance in constructive legislative work
will compel law schools to recognize the professional importance
of that side of the Jaw. The experience of the next ten years will
show whether the new jurisprudence can be placed upon a firm
and permanent basis and it will then be possible to discuss more
profitably its relation to other graduate work.

